Bank of Japan Press conference comparison — 30 October 2025 vs 19 March 2026
This Bank of Japan press conference comparison covers 30 October 2025 and 19 March 2026. Overall, the newer document was more hawkish. The Bank of Japan has kept its tightening bias intact across the two meetings while shifting the emphasis — inflation risks are now framed as tilting to the upside via oil prices, yen weakness and stronger price pass-through, whereas the previous meeting stressed near-term inflation cooling below target. What's new is the explicit delay factor: Middle East tensions, softer market risk sentiment and 'somewhat declined' confidence in the outlook are holding back the next…
What changed
More hawkish. The Bank of Japan has kept its tightening bias intact across the two meetings while shifting the emphasis — inflation risks are now framed as tilting to the upside via oil prices, yen weakness and stronger price pass-through, whereas the previous meeting stressed near-term inflation cooling below target. What's new is the explicit delay factor: Middle East tensions, softer market risk sentiment and 'somewhat declined' confidence in the outlook are holding back the next move, even as officials keep a hike on the table for the coming meetings.
- Inflation — More hawkish. The current document flips the inflation narrative from 'cooling below 2% with no urgency' to explicitly flagging oil- and yen-driven upside risks to underlying inflation, with warnings that pass-through may exceed the post-Ukraine episode and that second-round effects would justify a hike.
- Labour Market — Little changed. Both documents treat the wage-price mechanism and spring wage negotiations as the key durable-inflation test, with hawkish confidence in the mechanism carried over unchanged — only the framing moves from 'watch the initial momentum' to 'the outcome is becoming solid'.
- Rate Path — Little changed. Both hold (0.5% prior, 0.75% now) with the same conditional tightening bias and data-dependent guidance, but the current document offsets the unchanged 'we will continue to raise rates if the outlook is realized' language with fresh dovish caveats on Middle East market instability, financial conditions, and 'somewhat declined' confidence in the outlook.
- Balance Sheet — Little changed. No balance-sheet content in either signal set; the risk-balance framing stays two-sided, with trade-policy downside risk in the prior document replaced by Middle East/oil and financial-market risk in the current one.
Key wording
At today's meeting, first, we decided by a majority vote to maintain the monetary market operation guideline of encouraging the uncollateralized overnight call rate to remain at around 0.5 percent.
Member Takata submitted a proposal to raise the policy interest rate to around 0.75 percent, stating that the norm of prices not rising has shifted and that the achievement of the price stability target has been broadly attained, and Member Tamura also submitted a proposal to raise the policy rate to around 0.75 percent, stating that, with upside risks to prices expanding, it is appropriate to move somewhat closer to the neutral interest rate; however, both proposals were rejected by a majority vote.
Looking ahead, as the impact of rises in food prices such as rice diminishes, the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI excluding fresh food is likely to see its positive margin narrow to below 2 percent through the first half of the next fiscal year.
Regarding the risk balance for the economic outlook, taking into account the impact of trade policies of various countries, downside risks are considered larger for fiscal 2026. The risk balance for the price outlook is broadly balanced between upside and downside, as in the previous Outlook Report.
Given that the current real interest rate is at an extremely low level, if the above economic and price outlook is realized, we think that, in line with improvements in economic activity and prices, the Bank will continue to raise the policy interest rate and adjust the degree of monetary accommodation.
Regarding Japan's consumer prices, developments so far have been along the lines of the baseline scenario, in which the impact of food price rises diminishes while the underlying rate of price increases rises moderately, and we do not recognize that concerns about falling behind the curve are currently increasing.
At today's Monetary Policy Meeting, we decided by majority vote to maintain the guideline for money market operations of encouraging the uncollateralized overnight call rate to remain at around 0.75 percent. In addition, Member Takata proposed a motion to raise the policy interest rate to around 1.0 percent, arguing that the price stability target has been broadly achieved and that the risk of domestic inflation overshooting is high due to second-round effects of overseas-originated inflation, but the motion was rejected by majority vote.
Risk factors surrounding the outlook include future developments in the Middle East situation and crude oil price movements, overseas economic and price developments affected by the trade policies of various countries, firms' wage and price-setting behavior, and financial and foreign exchange market movements, and it is necessary to pay sufficient attention to their impact on Japan's economy and prices.
As for the outlook, as the effects of rising prices of food items such as rice diminish, and with the effects of the government's measures against high prices, the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index excluding fresh food is expected to shrink its positive margin to below 2 percent for a time, and thereafter the effects of the recent rise in crude oil prices will work in the direction of expanding the positive margin.
In conducting monetary policy, given that the current real interest rate is at a very low level, if the economic and price outlook as described above is realized, it is thought that we will continue to raise the policy interest rate and adjust the degree of monetary accommodation in accordance with improvements in economic and price conditions.
Next, regarding the second question, as for whether and when to raise rates going forward, as before, we will make appropriate judgments at each Monetary Policy Meeting while confirming the outlook and the probability and risks regarding economic and price conditions and the underlying rate of inflation.
On the other hand, if the rise in crude oil prices or the yen's depreciation leads to a rise in people's medium- to long-term inflation expectations, that is thought to work to push up the underlying rate of inflation.
Official documents
Background reading
Related
30 October 2025 press conference · 19 March 2026 press conference · Earlier meeting · Later meeting · Previous comparison · Next comparison · Methodology
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